| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w18804 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 18804 |
| Information and Quality when Motivation is Intrinsic: Evidence from Surgeon Report Cards | |
| Jonathan T. Kolstad | |
| 发表日期 | 2013-02-15 |
| 出版年 | 2013 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | If profit maximization is the objective of a firm, new information about quality should affect firm behavior only through its effects on market demand. I consider an alternate model in which suppliers are motivated by a desire to perform well in addition to profit. The introduction of quality "report cards" for cardiac surgery in Pennsylvania provides an empirical setting to isolate the relative role of extrinsic and intrinsic incentives in determining surgeon response. Information on performance that was new to surgeons and unrelated to patient demand led to an intrinsic response four times larger than surgeon response to profit incentives. |
| 主题 | Health, Education, and Welfare ; Health ; Industrial Organization ; Market Structure and Firm Performance |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w18804 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/576479 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Jonathan T. Kolstad. Information and Quality when Motivation is Intrinsic: Evidence from Surgeon Report Cards. 2013. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w18804.pdf（398KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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