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来源类型 | Working Paper |
规范类型 | 报告 |
DOI | 10.3386/w18862 |
来源ID | Working Paper 18862 |
When Is Prevention More Profitable than Cure? The Impact of Time-Varying Consumer Heterogeneity | |
Michael Kremer; Christopher M. Snyder | |
发表日期 | 2013-03-08 |
出版年 | 2013 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | We argue that in pharmaceutical markets, variation in the arrival time of consumer heterogeneity creates differences between a producer's ability to extract consumer surplus with preventives and treatments, potentially distorting R&D decisions. If consumers vary only in disease risk, revenue from treatments--sold after the disease is contracted, when disease risk is no longer a source of private information--always exceeds revenue from preventives. The revenue ratio can be arbitrarily high for sufficiently skewed distributions of disease risk. Under some circumstances, heterogeneity in harm from a disease, learned after a disease is contracted, can lead revenue from a treatment to exceed revenue from a preventative. Calibrations suggest that skewness in the U.S. distribution of HIV risk would lead firms to earn only half the revenue from a vaccine as from a drug. Empirical tests are consistent with the predictions of the model that vaccines are less likely to be developed for diseases with substantial disease-risk heterogeneity. |
主题 | Microeconomics ; Market Structure and Distribution ; Health, Education, and Welfare ; Health ; Industrial Organization ; Market Structure and Firm Performance ; Development and Growth ; Innovation and R& ; D |
URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w18862 |
来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
引用统计 | |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/576537 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Michael Kremer,Christopher M. Snyder. When Is Prevention More Profitable than Cure? The Impact of Time-Varying Consumer Heterogeneity. 2013. |
条目包含的文件 | ||||||
文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
w18862.pdf(377KB) | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 |
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