| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w18864 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 18864 |
| Speculative Runs on Interest Rate Pegs | |
| Marco Bassetto; Christopher Phelan | |
| 发表日期 | 2013-03-08 |
| 出版年 | 2013 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We analyze a new class of equilibria that emerges when a central bank conducts monetary policy by setting an interest rate (as an arbitrary function of its available information) and letting the private sector set the quantity traded. These equilibria involve a run on the central bank's interest target, whereby money grows fast, private agents borrow as much as possible against the central bank, and the shadow interest rate is different from the policy target. We argue that these equilibria represent a particular danger when banks hold large excess reserves, such as is the case following periods of quantitative easing. Our analysis suggests that successfully managing the exit strategy requires additional tools beyond setting interest-rate targets and paying interest on reserves; in particular, freezing excess reserves or fiscal-policy intervention may be needed to fend off adverse expectations. |
| 主题 | Macroeconomics ; Money and Interest Rates ; Monetary Policy ; Fiscal Policy |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w18864 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/576539 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Marco Bassetto,Christopher Phelan. Speculative Runs on Interest Rate Pegs. 2013. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w18864.pdf（428KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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