| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w18872 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 18872 |
| Incentivizing China's Urban Mayors to Mitigate Pollution Externalities: The Role of the Central Government and Public Environmentalism | |
| Siqi Zheng; Matthew E. Kahn; Weizeng Sun; Danglun Luo | |
| 发表日期 | 2013-03-08 |
| 出版年 | 2013 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | China's extremely high levels of urban air, water and greenhouse gas emissions levels pose local and global environmental challenges. China's urban leaders have substantial influence and discretion over the evolution of economic activity that generates such externalities. This paper examines the political economy of urban leaders' incentives to tackle pollution issues. Based on a principal-agent framework, we present evidence consistent with the hypothesis that both the central government and the public are placing pressure on China's urban leaders to mitigate externalities. Such "pro-green" incentives suggest that many of China's cities could enjoy significant environmental progress in the near future. |
| 主题 | Public Economics ; Taxation ; Public Goods ; Environmental and Resource Economics ; Energy ; Environment ; Regional and Urban Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w18872 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/576547 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Siqi Zheng,Matthew E. Kahn,Weizeng Sun,et al. Incentivizing China's Urban Mayors to Mitigate Pollution Externalities: The Role of the Central Government and Public Environmentalism. 2013. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w18872.pdf（588KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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