| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w18875 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 18875 |
| Mergers When Prices are Negotiated: Evidence from the Hospital Industry | |
| Gautam Gowrisankaran; Aviv Nevo; Robert Town | |
| 发表日期 | 2013-03-08 |
| 出版年 | 2013 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We estimate a bargaining model of competition between hospitals and managed care organizations (MCOs) and use the estimates to evaluate the effects of hospital mergers. We find that MCO bargaining restrains hospital prices significantly. The model demonstrates the potential impact of coinsurance rates, which allow MCOs to partly steer patients towards cheaper hospitals. We show that increasing patient coinsurance tenfold would reduce prices by 16%. We find that a proposed hospital acquisition in Northern Virginia that was challenged by the Federal Trade Commission would have significantly raised hospital prices. Remedies based on separate bargaining do not alleviate the price increases. |
| 主题 | Health, Education, and Welfare ; Health ; Industrial Organization ; Market Structure and Firm Performance ; Nonprofits |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w18875 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/576550 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Gautam Gowrisankaran,Aviv Nevo,Robert Town. Mergers When Prices are Negotiated: Evidence from the Hospital Industry. 2013. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w18875.pdf（538KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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