| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w18881 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 18881 |
| Sales Force and Competition in Financial Product Markets: The Case Of Mexico\u2019s Social Security Privatization | |
| Justine S. Hastings; Ali Hortaçsu; Chad Syverson | |
| 发表日期 | 2013-03-08 |
| 出版年 | 2013 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper examines how sales force impact competition and equilibrium prices in the context of a privatized pension market. We use detailed administrative data on fund manager choices and worker characteristics at the inception of Mexico’s privatized social security system, where fund managers had to set prices (management fees) at the national level, but could select sales force levels by local geographic areas. We develop and estimate a model of fund manager choice where sales force can increase or decrease customer price sensitivity. We find exposure to sales force lowered price sensitivity, leading to inelastic demand and high equilibrium fees. We simulate oft-proposed policy solutions: a supply-side policy with a competitive government player and a demand-side policy which increases price elasticity. We find that demand-side policies are necessary to foster competition in social safety net markets with large segments of inelastic consumers. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Households and Firms ; Financial Economics ; Portfolio Selection and Asset Pricing ; Industrial Organization ; Firm Behavior ; Regulatory Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w18881 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/576556 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Justine S. Hastings,Ali Hortaçsu,Chad Syverson. Sales Force and Competition in Financial Product Markets: The Case Of Mexico\u2019s Social Security Privatization. 2013. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w18881.pdf（539KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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