| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w18891 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 18891 |
| Seeking Alpha: Excess Risk Taking and Competition for Managerial Talent | |
| Viral V. Acharya; Marco Pagano; Paolo Volpin | |
| 发表日期 | 2013-03-14 |
| 出版年 | 2013 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We present a model in which managers are risk-averse and firms compete for scarce managerial talent ("alpha"). When managers are not mobile across firms, firms provide efficient compensation, which allows for learning about managerial talent and for insurance of low-quality managers. When instead managers can move across firms, firms cannot offer co-insurance among employees. In anticipation, risk-averse managers may churn across firms or undertake aggregate risks in order to delay the revelation of their true quality. The result is excessive risk-taking with pay for short-term performance and an accumulation of long-term risks. We conclude with a discussion of policies to address the inefficiency in compensation. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions ; Corporate Finance ; Labor Economics ; Labor Compensation |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w18891 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/576566 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Viral V. Acharya,Marco Pagano,Paolo Volpin. Seeking Alpha: Excess Risk Taking and Competition for Managerial Talent. 2013. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w18891.pdf（430KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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