| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w18903 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 18903 |
| Indirect Incentives of Hedge Fund Managers | |
| Jongha Lim; Berk A. Sensoy; Michael S. Weisbach | |
| 发表日期 | 2013-03-21 |
| 出版年 | 2013 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Indirect incentives exist in the money management industry when good current performance increases future inflows of new capital, leading to higher future fees. We quantify the magnitude of indirect performance incentives for hedge fund managers. Flows respond quickly and strongly to performance; lagged performance has a monotonically decreasing impact on flows as lags increase up to two years. Conservative estimates indicate that indirect incentives for the average fund are four times as large as direct incentives from incentive fees and returns to managers' own investment in the fund. For new funds, indirect incentives are seven times as large as direct incentives. Combining direct and indirect incentives, for each dollar generated for their investors in a given year, managers receive close to another dollar in direct performance fees plus the present value of future fees over the expected life of the fund. Older and capacity constrained funds have considerably weaker relations between future flows and performance, leading to weaker indirect incentives. There is no evidence that direct contractual incentives are stronger when market-based indirect incentives are weaker. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions ; Corporate Finance ; Labor Economics ; Labor Compensation |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w18903 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/576578 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Jongha Lim,Berk A. Sensoy,Michael S. Weisbach. Indirect Incentives of Hedge Fund Managers. 2013. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w18903.pdf（451KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
