| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w18923 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 18923 |
| Who Should Pay for Credit Ratings and How? | |
| Anil K. Kashyap; Natalia Kovrijnykh | |
| 发表日期 | 2013-03-28 |
| 出版年 | 2013 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We analyze a model where investors use a credit rating to decide whether to finance a firm. The rating quality depends on unobservable effort exerted by a credit rating agency (CRA). We study optimal compensation schemes for the CRA when a planner, the firm, or investors order the rating. Rating errors are larger when the firm orders it than when investors do (and both produce larger errors than is socially optimal). Investors overuse ratings relative to the firm or planner. A trade-off in providing time-consistent incentives embedded in the optimal compensation structure makes the CRA slow to acknowledge mistakes. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Economics of Information ; Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w18923 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/576598 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Anil K. Kashyap,Natalia Kovrijnykh. Who Should Pay for Credit Ratings and How?. 2013. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w18923.pdf（430KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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