| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w19001 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 19001 |
| More is Less: Why Parties May Deliberately Write Incomplete Contracts | |
| Maija Halonen-Akatwijuka; Oliver D. Hart | |
| 发表日期 | 2013-04-25 |
| 出版年 | 2013 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Why are contracts incomplete? Transaction costs and bounded rationality cannot be a total explanation since states of the world are often describable, foreseeable, and yet are not mentioned in a contract. Asymmetric information theories also have limitations. We offer an explanation based on "contracts as reference points". Including a contingency of the form, "The buyer will require a good in event E", has a benefit and a cost. The benefit is that if E occurs there is less to argue about; the cost is that the additional reference point provided by the outcome in E can hinder (re)negotiation in states outside E. We show that if parties agree about a reasonable division of surplus, an incomplete contract can be strictly superior to a contingent contract. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Households and Firms ; Economics of Information ; Other ; Law and Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w19001 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/576675 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Maija Halonen-Akatwijuka,Oliver D. Hart. More is Less: Why Parties May Deliberately Write Incomplete Contracts. 2013. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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