| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w19022 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 19022 |
| Sustainable Shadow Banking | |
| Guillermo Ordonez | |
| 发表日期 | 2013-05-02 |
| 出版年 | 2013 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Commercial banks are subject to regulation that restricts their investments. When banks are concerned for their reputation, however, they could self-regulate and invest more efficiently. Hence, a shadow banking that arises to avoid regulation has the potential to improve welfare. Still, reputation concerns depend on future economic prospects and may suddenly disappear, generating a collapse of shadow banking and a return to traditional banking, with a decline in welfare. I discuss how a combination of traditional regulation and cross reputation subsidization may enhance shadow banking and make it more sustainable. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Economics of Information ; Macroeconomics ; Money and Interest Rates ; Financial Economics ; Financial Markets ; Financial Institutions |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w19022 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/576695 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Guillermo Ordonez. Sustainable Shadow Banking. 2013. |
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