G2TT
来源类型Working Paper
规范类型报告
DOI10.3386/w19101
来源IDWorking Paper 19101
The Effect of Medicare Advantage on Hospital Admissions and Mortality
Christopher C. Afendulis; Michael E. Chernew; Daniel P. Kessler
发表日期2013-06-06
出版年2013
语种英语
摘要Medicare currently allows beneficiaries to choose between a government-run health plan and a privately- administered program known as Medicare Advantage (MA). Because enrollment in MA is optional, conventional observational estimates of the program's impact are potentially subject to selection bias. To address this, we use a discontinuity in the rules governing MA payments to health plans that gives greater payments to plans operating in counties in Metropolitan Statistical Areas with populations of 250,000 or more. The sharp difference in payment rates at this population cutoff creates a greater incentive for plans to increase the generosity of benefits and therefore enroll more beneficiaries in MA in counties just above versus just below the cutoff. We find that the expansion of MA on this margin reduces beneficiaries' rates of hospitalization and mortality.
主题Health, Education, and Welfare ; Health
URLhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w19101
来源智库National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/576776
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GB/T 7714
Christopher C. Afendulis,Michael E. Chernew,Daniel P. Kessler. The Effect of Medicare Advantage on Hospital Admissions and Mortality. 2013.
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