| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w19132 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 19132 |
| Deposit Insurance and Orderly Liquidation without Commitment: Can we Sleep Well? | |
| Russell Cooper; Hubert Kempf | |
| 发表日期 | 2013-06-13 |
| 出版年 | 2013 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper assess the affects of the orderly liquidation of a failing bank and the ex post provision of deposit insurance on the prospect of bank runs. Assuming that the public institutions in charge of these policies lack commitment power, these interventions, both individually and jointly, are chosen and undertaken ex post. The costs of liquidation and redistribution across heterogenous households play key roles in these decisions. If investment is suffciently illiquid, a credible liquidation policy will deter runs. Deposit insurance will not be provided ex post if it requires a (socially) undesirable redistribution of consumption that outweighs insurance gains. Despite the lack of commitment, runs can be prevented by the provision of deposit insurance funded by an optimally designed ex post tax scheme. |
| 主题 | Macroeconomics ; Money and Interest Rates ; Monetary Policy ; Financial Economics ; Financial Markets |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w19132 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/576806 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Russell Cooper,Hubert Kempf. Deposit Insurance and Orderly Liquidation without Commitment: Can we Sleep Well?. 2013. |
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