| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w19139 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 19139 |
| Why High Leverage is Optimal for Banks | |
| Harry DeAngelo; René M. Stulz | |
| 发表日期 | 2013-06-20 |
| 出版年 | 2013 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Liquidity production is a central role of banks. We show that, under idealized conditions, high leverage is optimal for banks when there is a market premium for (socially valuable) liquid financial claims and no deviations from Modigliani and Miller (1958) due to agency problems, deposit insurance, taxes, or any other distortions. Our model can explain (i) why bank leverage increased over the last 150 years or so, (ii) why high bank leverage per se does not necessarily cause systemic risk, and (iii) why limits on the leverage of regulated banks impede their ability to compete with unregulated shadow banks. Our model indicates that MM's debt-equity neutrality principle is inapplicable to banks. Because debt-equity neutrality assigns zero weight to the social value of liquidity, it is an inappropriately equity-biased baseline for assessing whether the high leverage ratios of real-world banks are excessive. |
| 主题 | Macroeconomics ; Money and Interest Rates ; Monetary Policy ; Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions ; Corporate Finance ; Industrial Organization ; Regulatory Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w19139 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/576813 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Harry DeAngelo,René M. Stulz. Why High Leverage is Optimal for Banks. 2013. |
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