| 来源类型 | Working Paper
|
| 规范类型 | 报告
|
| DOI | 10.3386/w19192
|
| 来源ID | Working Paper 19192
|
| Bailouts, Time Inconsistency, and Optimal Regulation |
| V.V. Chari; Patrick J. Kehoe
|
| 发表日期 | 2013-06-28
|
| 出版年 | 2013
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | We develop a model in which, in order to provide managerial incentives, it is optimal to have costly bankruptcy. If benevolent governments can commit to their policies, it is optimal not to interfere with private contracts. Such policies are time inconsistent in the sense that, without commitment, governments have incentives to bail out firms by buying up the debt of distressed firms and renegotiating their contracts with managers. From an ex ante perspective, however, such bailouts are costly because they worsen incentives and thereby reduce welfare. We show that regulation in the form of limits on the debt-to-value ratio of firms mitigates the time-inconsistency problem by eliminating the incentives of governments to undertake bailouts. In terms of the cyclical properties of regulation, we show that regulation should be tightest in aggregate states in which resources lost to bankruptcy in the equilibrium without a government are largest. |
| 主题 | Macroeconomics
; Money and Interest Rates
; Fiscal Policy
|
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w19192
|
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
|
| 引用统计 |
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
|
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/576865
|
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
V.V. Chari,Patrick J. Kehoe. Bailouts, Time Inconsistency, and Optimal Regulation. 2013.
|
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
