| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w19212 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 19212 |
| Linear Social Interactions Models | |
| Lawrence E. Blume; William A. Brock; Steven N. Durlauf; Rajshri Jayaraman | |
| 发表日期 | 2013-07-11 |
| 出版年 | 2013 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper provides a systematic analysis of identification in linear social interactions models. This is both a theoretical and an econometric exercise as the analysis is linked to a rigorously delineated model of interdependent decisions. We develop an incomplete information game that describes individual choices in the presence of social interactions. The equilibrium strategy profiles are linear. Standard models in the empirical social interactions literature are shown to be exact or approximate special cases of our general framework, which in turn provides a basis for understanding the microeconomic foundations of those models. We consider identification of both endogenous (peer) and contextual social effects under alternative assumptions on a priori information about network structure available to an analyst, and contrast the informational content of individual-level and aggregated data. Finally, we discuss potential ramifications for identification of endogenous group selection and differences between the information sets of analysts and agents. |
| 主题 | Econometrics ; Estimation Methods ; Microeconomics ; Game Theory ; Other ; Culture |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w19212 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/576885 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Lawrence E. Blume,William A. Brock,Steven N. Durlauf,et al. Linear Social Interactions Models. 2013. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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