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来源类型Working Paper
规范类型报告
DOI10.3386/w19221
来源IDWorking Paper 19221
Conflict, Evolution, Hegemony, and the Power of the State
David K. Levine; Salvatore Modica
发表日期2013-07-11
出版年2013
语种英语
摘要In a model of evolution driven by conflict between societies more powerful states have an advantage. When the influence of outsiders is small we show that this results in a tendency to hegemony. In a simple example in which institutions differ in their "exclusiveness" we find that these hegemonies will be inefficiently "extractive" in the sense of having inefficiently high taxes, high compensation for state officials, and low welfare.
主题Other ; General, Teaching ; Econometrics ; Microeconomics ; Game Theory ; Behavioral Economics ; Market Structure and Distribution ; Welfare and Collective Choice
URLhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w19221
来源智库National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/576894
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
David K. Levine,Salvatore Modica. Conflict, Evolution, Hegemony, and the Power of the State. 2013.
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