| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w19221 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 19221 |
| Conflict, Evolution, Hegemony, and the Power of the State | |
| David K. Levine; Salvatore Modica | |
| 发表日期 | 2013-07-11 |
| 出版年 | 2013 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In a model of evolution driven by conflict between societies more powerful states have an advantage. When the influence of outsiders is small we show that this results in a tendency to hegemony. In a simple example in which institutions differ in their "exclusiveness" we find that these hegemonies will be inefficiently "extractive" in the sense of having inefficiently high taxes, high compensation for state officials, and low welfare. |
| 主题 | Other ; General, Teaching ; Econometrics ; Microeconomics ; Game Theory ; Behavioral Economics ; Market Structure and Distribution ; Welfare and Collective Choice |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w19221 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/576894 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | David K. Levine,Salvatore Modica. Conflict, Evolution, Hegemony, and the Power of the State. 2013. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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