| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w19242 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 19242 |
| Physicians Treating Physicians: Information and Incentives in Childbirth | |
| Erin M. Johnson; M. Marit Rehavi | |
| 发表日期 | 2013-07-18 |
| 出版年 | 2013 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper provides new evidence on the interaction between patient information and financial incentives in physician induced demand (PID). Using rich microdata on childbirth, we compare the treatment of physicians when they are patients with that of comparable non-physicians. We exploit a unique institutional feature of California to determine how inducement varies with obstetricians' financial incentives. Consistent with PID, physicians are almost 10 percent less likely to receive a C-section, with only a quarter of this effect attributable to differential sorting of patients to hospitals or obstetricians. Financial incentives have a large effect on C-section probabilities for non-physicians, but physician-patients are relatively unaffected. Physicians also have better health outcomes, suggesting overuse of C-sections adversely impacts patient health. |
| 主题 | Health, Education, and Welfare ; Health |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w19242 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/576916 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Erin M. Johnson,M. Marit Rehavi. Physicians Treating Physicians: Information and Incentives in Childbirth. 2013. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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