| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w19278 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 19278 |
| Government Debt and Banking Fragility: The Spreading of Strategic Uncertainty | |
| Russell Cooper; Kalin Nikolov | |
| 发表日期 | 2013-08-09 |
| 出版年 | 2013 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper studies the interaction of government debt and financial markets. Both markets are fragile: excessively responsive to fundamentals and prone to strategic uncertainty. This interaction, termed a ‘diabolic loop’, is driven by government choice to bail out banks and the resulting incentives for banks to hold government debt rather than to self-insure through equity buffers. We provide conditions such that the ‘diabolic loop’ is a Nash Equilibrium of the interaction between banks and the government. Instability originates in debt markets and is channeled to financial arrangements, and then back again. The analysis highlights the critical role of bank equity for the existence of a diabolic loop. When equity is issued, no diabolic loop exists. In equilibrium, banks' rational expectations of a bailout ensure that no equity is issued and the sovereign-bank loop operates. |
| 主题 | Macroeconomics ; Money and Interest Rates ; Financial Economics ; Corporate Finance ; Public Economics ; National Fiscal Issues |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w19278 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/576953 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Russell Cooper,Kalin Nikolov. Government Debt and Banking Fragility: The Spreading of Strategic Uncertainty. 2013. |
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