| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w19279 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 19279 |
| You Get What You Pay For: Schooling Incentives and Child Labor | |
| Eric V. Edmonds; Maheshwor Shrestha | |
| 发表日期 | 2013-08-09 |
| 出版年 | 2013 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Can efforts to promote education deter child labor? We report on the findings of a field experiment where a conditional transfer incentivized the schooling of children associated with carpet factories in Nepal. We find that schooling increases and child involvement in carpet weaving decreases when schooling is incentivized. As a simple static labor supply model would predict, we observe that treated children resort to their counterfactual level of school attendance and carpet weaving when schooling is no longer incentivized. From a child labor policy perspective, our findings imply that "You get what you pay for" when schooling incentives are used to combat hazardous child labor. |
| 主题 | Labor Economics ; Labor Supply and Demand ; Development and Growth ; Development |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w19279 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/576954 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Eric V. Edmonds,Maheshwor Shrestha. You Get What You Pay For: Schooling Incentives and Child Labor. 2013. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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