| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w19303 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 19303 |
| The Incentive Effect of Scores: Randomized Evidence from Credit Committees | |
| Daniel Paravisini; Antoinette Schoar | |
| 发表日期 | 2013-08-09 |
| 出版年 | 2013 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We design a randomized controlled trial to evaluate the adoption of credit scoring with a bank that uses soft information in small businesses lending. We find that credit scores improve the productivity of credit committees, reduce managerial involvement in the loan approval process, and increase the profitability of lending. Credit committee members' effort and output also increase when they anticipate the score becoming available, indicating that scores improve incentives to use existing information. Our results imply that credit scores improve the efficiency and decentralize decision-making in loan production, which has implications for the optimal organization of banks. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Households and Firms ; Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions ; Industrial Organization ; Firm Behavior ; Development and Growth ; Innovation and R& ; D |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w19303 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/576978 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Daniel Paravisini,Antoinette Schoar. The Incentive Effect of Scores: Randomized Evidence from Credit Committees. 2013. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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