| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w19352 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 19352 |
| Regulating Bidder Participation in Auctions | |
| Vivek Bhattacharya; James W. Roberts; Andrew Sweeting | |
| 发表日期 | 2013-08-22 |
| 出版年 | 2013 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Regulating bidder participation in auctions can potentially increase efficiency compared to standard auction formats with free entry. We show that the relative performance of two such mechanisms, a standard first-price auction with free entry and an entry rights auction, depends non-monotonically on the precision of information that bidders have about their costs prior to deciding whether to participate in a mechanism. As an empirical application, we estimate parameters from first-price auctions with free entry for bridge-building contracts in Oklahoma and Texas and predict that an entry rights auction increases efficiency and reduces procurement costs significantly. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Game Theory ; Market Structure and Distribution ; Industrial Organization ; Firm Behavior ; Industry Studies |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w19352 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/577027 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Vivek Bhattacharya,James W. Roberts,Andrew Sweeting. Regulating Bidder Participation in Auctions. 2013. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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