| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w19379 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 19379 |
| Innovation and the Financial Guillotine | |
| Ramana Nanda; Matthew Rhodes-Kropf | |
| 发表日期 | 2013-08-29 |
| 出版年 | 2013 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Our paper demonstrates that while failure tolerance by investors may encourage potential entrepreneurs to innovate, financiers with investment strategies that tolerate early failure endogenously choose to fund less radical innovations. Failure tolerance as an equilibrium price that increases in the level of experimentation. More experimental projects that don't generate enough to pay the price cannot be started. In equilibrium all competing financiers may choose to offer failure tolerant contracts to attract entrepreneurs, leaving no capital to fund the most radical, experimental projects. The tradeoff between failure tolerance and a sharp guillotine helps explain when and where radical innovation occurs. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions ; Corporate Finance ; Development and Growth ; Innovation and R& ; D |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w19379 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/577054 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Ramana Nanda,Matthew Rhodes-Kropf. Innovation and the Financial Guillotine. 2013. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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