| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w19399 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 19399 |
| Equilibria in Health Exchanges: Adverse Selection vs. Reclassification Risk | |
| Benjamin R. Handel; Igal Hendel; Michael D. Whinston | |
| 发表日期 | 2013-09-05 |
| 出版年 | 2013 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper studies regulated health insurance markets known as exchanges, motivated by their inclusion in the Affordable Care Act (ACA). We use detailed health plan choice and utilization data to model individual-level projected health risk and risk preferences. We combine the estimated joint distribution of risk and risk preferences with a model of competitive insurance markets to predict outcomes under different regulations that govern insurers' ability to use health status information in pricing. We investigate the welfare implications of these regulations with an emphasis on two potential sources of inefficiency: (i) adverse selection and (ii) premium reclassification risk. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Economics of Information ; Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions ; Health, Education, and Welfare ; Health |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w19399 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/577074 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Benjamin R. Handel,Igal Hendel,Michael D. Whinston. Equilibria in Health Exchanges: Adverse Selection vs. Reclassification Risk. 2013. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
