| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w19407 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 19407 |
| Equity Vesting and Managerial Myopia | |
| Alex Edmans; Vivian W. Fang; Katharina A. Lewellen | |
| 发表日期 | 2013-09-05 |
| 出版年 | 2013 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper links the impending vesting of CEO equity to reductions in real investment. Existing studies measure the manager's short-term concerns using the sensitivity of his equity to the stock price. However, in myopia theories, the driver of short-termism is not the magnitude of incentives but their horizon. We use recent changes in compensation disclosure to introduce a new empirical measure that is tightly linked to theory - the sensitivity of equity vesting over the upcoming year. This sensitivity is determined by equity grants made several years prior, and thus unlikely to be driven by current investment opportunities. An interquartile increase is associated with a decline of 0.11% in the growth of R&D (scaled by total assets), 37% of the average R&D growth rate. Similar results hold when including advertising and capital expenditure. Newly-vesting equity increases the likelihood of meeting or beating analyst earnings forecasts by a narrow margin. However, the market's reaction to doing so is lower, suggesting that it recognizes CEOs' myopic incentives. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Corporate Finance |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w19407 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/577082 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Alex Edmans,Vivian W. Fang,Katharina A. Lewellen. Equity Vesting and Managerial Myopia. 2013. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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