G2TT
来源类型Working Paper
规范类型报告
DOI10.3386/w19412
来源IDWorking Paper 19412
Compensation Matters: Incentives for Multitasking in a Law Firm
Ann Bartel; Brianna Cardiff-Hicks; Kathryn Shaw
发表日期2013-09-05
出版年2013
语种英语
摘要Due to the limited availability of firm-level compensation data, there is little empirical evidence on the impact of compensation plans on personal productivity. We study an international law firm that moves from high-powered individual incentives towards incentives for "leadership" activities that contribute to the firm's long run profitability. The effect of this change on the task allocation of the firm's team leaders is large and robust; team leaders increase their non-billable hours and shift billable hours to team members. Although the motivation for the change in the compensation plan was the multitasking problem, this change also impacted the way tasks were allocated within each team, resulting in greater teamwork.
主题Labor Economics ; Labor Compensation ; Industrial Organization ; Firm Behavior ; Industry Studies
URLhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w19412
来源智库National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/577087
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Ann Bartel,Brianna Cardiff-Hicks,Kathryn Shaw. Compensation Matters: Incentives for Multitasking in a Law Firm. 2013.
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