| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w19432 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 19432 |
| Do Managers Do Good with Other People's Money? | |
| Ing-Haw Cheng; Harrison Hong; Kelly Shue | |
| 发表日期 | 2013-09-12 |
| 出版年 | 2013 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We find support for two key predictions of an agency theory of unproductive corporate social responsibility. First, increasing managerial ownership decreases measures of firm goodness. We use the 2003 Dividend Tax Cut to increase after-tax insider ownership. Firms with moderate levels of insider ownership cut goodness by more than firms with low levels (where the tax cut has no effect) and high levels (where agency is less of an issue). Second, increasing monitoring reduces corporate goodness. A regression discontinuity design of close votes around the 50% cut-off finds that passage of shareholder governance proposals leads to slower growth in goodness. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Behavioral Economics ; Financial Economics ; Financial Markets ; Corporate Finance |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w19432 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/577108 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Ing-Haw Cheng,Harrison Hong,Kelly Shue. Do Managers Do Good with Other People's Money?. 2013. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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