| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w19467 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 19467 |
| Relationship and Transaction Lending in a Crisis | |
| Patrick Bolton; Xavier Freixas; Leonardo Gambacorta; Paolo Emilio Mistrulli | |
| 发表日期 | 2013-09-26 |
| 出版年 | 2013 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study how relationship lending and transaction lending vary over the business cycle. We develop a model in which relationship banks gather information on their borrowers, which allows them to provide loans for profitable firms during a crisis. Due to the services they provide, operating costs of relationship- banks are higher than those of transaction-banks. In our model, where relationship-banks compete with transaction-banks, a key result is that relationship-banks charge a higher intermediation spread in normal times, but offer continuation-lending at more favorable terms than transaction banks to profitable firms in a crisis. Using detailed credit register information for Italian banks before and after the Lehman Brothers' default, we are able to study how relationship and transaction-banks responded to the crisis and we test existing theories of relationship banking. Our empirical analysis confirms the basic prediction of the model that relationship banks charged a higher spread before the crisis, offered more favorable continuation-lending terms in response to the crisis, and suffered fewer defaults, thus confirming the informational advantage of relationship banking. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions ; Corporate Finance |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w19467 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/577141 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Patrick Bolton,Xavier Freixas,Leonardo Gambacorta,et al. Relationship and Transaction Lending in a Crisis. 2013. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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