G2TT
来源类型Working Paper
规范类型报告
DOI10.3386/w19472
来源IDWorking Paper 19472
Incentivizing Calculated Risk-Taking: Evidence from an Experiment with Commercial Bank Loan Officers
Shawn Cole; Martin Kanz; Leora Klapper
发表日期2013-09-26
出版年2013
语种英语
摘要We use an experiment with commercial bank loan officers to test how performance based compensation affects risk-assessment and lending. High-powered incentives lead to greater screening effort and more profitable lending decisions. This effect, however, is muted by deferred compensation and limited liability, two standard features of loan officer incentive contracts. We find that career concerns and personality traits affect screening behavior, but show that the response to monetary incentives does not vary with traits such as risk-aversion, optimism or overconfidence. Finally, we present evidence that incentive contracts distort the assessment of credit risk, even among trained professionals with many years of experience. Loans evaluated under permissive incentives are rated significantly less risky than the same loans evaluated under pay-for-performance.
主题Microeconomics ; Behavioral Economics ; Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions ; Labor Economics ; Labor Compensation
URLhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w19472
来源智库National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/577146
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GB/T 7714
Shawn Cole,Martin Kanz,Leora Klapper. Incentivizing Calculated Risk-Taking: Evidence from an Experiment with Commercial Bank Loan Officers. 2013.
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