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来源类型 | Working Paper |
规范类型 | 报告 |
DOI | 10.3386/w19472 |
来源ID | Working Paper 19472 |
Incentivizing Calculated Risk-Taking: Evidence from an Experiment with Commercial Bank Loan Officers | |
Shawn Cole; Martin Kanz; Leora Klapper | |
发表日期 | 2013-09-26 |
出版年 | 2013 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | We use an experiment with commercial bank loan officers to test how performance based compensation affects risk-assessment and lending. High-powered incentives lead to greater screening effort and more profitable lending decisions. This effect, however, is muted by deferred compensation and limited liability, two standard features of loan officer incentive contracts. We find that career concerns and personality traits affect screening behavior, but show that the response to monetary incentives does not vary with traits such as risk-aversion, optimism or overconfidence. Finally, we present evidence that incentive contracts distort the assessment of credit risk, even among trained professionals with many years of experience. Loans evaluated under permissive incentives are rated significantly less risky than the same loans evaluated under pay-for-performance. |
主题 | Microeconomics ; Behavioral Economics ; Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions ; Labor Economics ; Labor Compensation |
URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w19472 |
来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
引用统计 | |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/577146 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Shawn Cole,Martin Kanz,Leora Klapper. Incentivizing Calculated Risk-Taking: Evidence from an Experiment with Commercial Bank Loan Officers. 2013. |
条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 |
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