| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w19477 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 19477 |
| Distributional Incentives in an Equilibrium Model of Domestic Sovereign Default | |
| Pablo D'; Erasmo; Enrique G. Mendoza | |
| 发表日期 | 2013-09-26 |
| 出版年 | 2013 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Europe’s debt crisis resembles historical episodes of outright default on domestic public debt about which little research exists. This paper proposes a theory of domestic sovereign default based on distributional incentives affecting the welfare of risk-averse debt- and non-debt holders. A utilitarian government cannot sustain debt if default is costless. If default is costly, debt with default risk is sustainable, and debt falls as concentration of debt ownership rises. A government favoring bond holders can also sustain debt, with debt rising as ownership becomes more concentrated. These results are robust to adding foreign investors, redistributive taxes, or a second asset. |
| 主题 | Macroeconomics ; Money and Interest Rates ; Fiscal Policy ; International Economics ; International Finance ; Public Economics ; National Fiscal Issues |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w19477 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/577151 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Pablo D',Erasmo,Enrique G. Mendoza. Distributional Incentives in an Equilibrium Model of Domestic Sovereign Default. 2013. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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