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来源类型Working Paper
规范类型报告
DOI10.3386/w19485
来源IDWorking Paper 19485
Asymmetric Incentives in Subsidies: Evidence from a Large-Scale Electricity Rebate Program
Koichiro Ito
发表日期2013-09-26
出版年2013
语种英语
摘要Many countries use substantial public funds to subsidize reductions in negative externalities. However, such subsidies create asymmetric incentives because increases in externalities remain unpriced. This paper examines implications of such asymmetric subsidy incentives by using a regression discontinuity design in California's electricity rebate program that provided a financial reward for energy conservation. Using household-level panel data from administrative records, I find precisely-estimated zero causal effects in coastal areas. In contrast, the incentive produced a 5% consumption reduction in inland areas. Income and climate conditions significantly drive the heterogeneity. Asymmetric subsidy structures weaken incentives because consumers far from the rebate target show little response. The overall program cost is 17.5 cents per kWh reduction and $390 per ton of carbon dioxide reduction, which is unlikely to be cost-effective for a reasonable range of the social marginal cost of electricity.
主题Industrial Organization ; Market Structure and Firm Performance ; Regulatory Economics ; Industry Studies ; Environmental and Resource Economics ; Energy ; Environment
URLhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w19485
来源智库National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/577159
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714		 Koichiro Ito. Asymmetric Incentives in Subsidies: Evidence from a Large-Scale Electricity Rebate Program. 2013.
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