G2TT
来源类型Working Paper
规范类型报告
DOI10.3386/w19514
来源IDWorking Paper 19514
Predatory Short Selling
Markus K. Brunnermeier; Martin Oehmke
发表日期2013-10-10
出版年2013
语种英语
摘要Financial institutions may be vulnerable to predatory short selling. When the stock of a financial institution is shorted aggressively, leverage constraints imposed by short-term creditors can force the institution to liquidate long-term investments at fire sale prices. For financial institutions that are sufficiently close to their leverage constraints, predatory short selling equilibria co-exist with no-liquidation equilibria (the vulnerability region) or may even be the unique equilibrium outcome (the doomed region). Increased coordination among short sellers expands the doomed region, where liquidation is the unique equilibrium. Our model provides a potential justification for temporary restrictions on short selling of vulnerable institutions and can be used to assess recent empirical evidence on short-sale bans.
主题Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions
URLhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w19514
来源智库National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/577187
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Markus K. Brunnermeier,Martin Oehmke. Predatory Short Selling. 2013.
条目包含的文件
条目无相关文件。
个性服务
推荐该条目
保存到收藏夹
导出为Endnote文件
谷歌学术
谷歌学术中相似的文章
[Markus K. Brunnermeier]的文章
[Martin Oehmke]的文章
百度学术
百度学术中相似的文章
[Markus K. Brunnermeier]的文章
[Martin Oehmke]的文章
必应学术
必应学术中相似的文章
[Markus K. Brunnermeier]的文章
[Martin Oehmke]的文章
相关权益政策
暂无数据
收藏/分享

除非特别说明,本系统中所有内容都受版权保护,并保留所有权利。