| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w19601 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 19601 |
| Experimentation in Federal Systems | |
| Steven Callander; Bård Harstad | |
| 发表日期 | 2013-10-31 |
| 出版年 | 2013 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We present a model where heterogeneous districts choose both whether to experiment and the policies to experiment with. Since districts learn from each other, the first-best requires that policy experiments converge so that innovations are useful also for neighbors. However, the equilibrium implies the reverse - policy divergence - since each district uses its policy choice to discourage free-riding. We then study a clumsy central government that harmonizes final policy choices. This progressive concentration of power induces a policy tournament that can increase the incentive to experiment and encourage policy convergence. We derive the best political regime as well as the optimal levels of heterogeneity, transparency, prizes, and intellectual property rights. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Subnational Fiscal Issues |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w19601 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/577275 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Steven Callander,Bård Harstad. Experimentation in Federal Systems. 2013. |
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