| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w19620 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 19620 |
| Pollution Control Effort at China's River Borders: When Does Free Riding Cease? | |
| Matthew E. Kahn; Pei Li; Daxuan Zhao | |
| 发表日期 | 2013-11-07 |
| 出版年 | 2013 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | At political boundaries, local leaders often have weak incentives to reduce polluting activity because the social costs are borne by downstream neighbors. This paper exploits a natural experiment set in China in which the central government changed the local political promotion criteria and hence incentivized local officials to reduce border pollution along specific criteria. Using a difference in difference approach, we document evidence of pollution progress with respect to targeted criteria at river boundaries. Other indicators of water quality, not targeted by the central government, do not improve after the regime shift. Using data on the economic geography of key industrial water polluters, we explore possible mechanisms. |
| 主题 | Public Economics ; Taxation ; Public Goods ; Regional and Urban Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w19620 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/577295 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Matthew E. Kahn,Pei Li,Daxuan Zhao. Pollution Control Effort at China's River Borders: When Does Free Riding Cease?. 2013. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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