全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Moral Hazard and Economies of Scope in Physician Ownership of Complementary Medical Services

G2TT

来源类型	Working Paper
规范类型	报告
DOI	10.3386/w19622
来源ID	Working Paper 19622
	Moral Hazard and Economies of Scope in Physician Ownership of Complementary Medical Services
	Brian K. Chen; Paul J. Gertler; Chuh-Yuh Yang
发表日期	2013-11-07
出版年	2013
语种	英语
摘要	When physicians own complementary medical service facilities such as clinical laboratories and imaging centers, they gain financially by referring patients to these service entities. This situation creates an incentive for the physician to exploit the consumers' trust by recommending more services than they would demand under full information. This moral hazard cost, however, may be offset by gains in economies of scope if the complementary services are integrated into the physician's practice. We assess the extent of moral hazard and economies of scope using data from Taiwan, which introduced a "separating" policy, similar to the Stark Law in the US, that restricts physician ownership of pharmacies unless they are fully integrated into the physician's practice. We find that physicians who own pharmacies prescribe 7.6% more drugs than those who do not own pharmacies. Overall, we find no evidence of economies of scope from integration in the treatment of patients with acute respiratory infections, diabetes, or hypertension. Overall the separating policy was ineffective at controlling drug costs as a large number of physicians choose to integrate pharmacies into their practices in order to become exempt from the policy.
主题	Health, Education, and Welfare ; Health ; Other ; Law and Economics ; Industrial Organization ; Firm Behavior
URL	https://www.nber.org/papers/w19622
来源智库	National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/577297
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Brian K. Chen,Paul J. Gertler,Chuh-Yuh Yang. Moral Hazard and Economies of Scope in Physician Ownership of Complementary Medical Services. 2013.