| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w19645 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 19645 |
| Reducing Moral Hazard in Employment Relationships: Experimental Evidence on Managerial Control and Performance Pay | |
| C. Kirabo Jackson; Henry S. Schneider | |
| 发表日期 | 2013-11-14 |
| 出版年 | 2013 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Moral hazard is endemic to employment relationships and firms often use performance pay and managerial control to address this problem. While performance pay has received much empirical attention, managerial control has not. We analyze data from a managerial-control field experiment in which an auto-repair firm provided detailed checklists to mechanics and monitored their use. Revenue was 20 percent higher under the experiment. We compare this effect to that of quasi-experimental increases in mechanic commission rates. The managerial-control effect is equivalent to that of a 10 percent commission increase. We find evidence of complementarities between the two, suggesting benefits from an all-of-the-above approach. We also find evidence of incentive gaming under performance pay. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Economics of Information ; Public Economics ; Labor Economics ; Labor Compensation ; Labor Market Structures |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w19645 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/577319 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | C. Kirabo Jackson,Henry S. Schneider. Reducing Moral Hazard in Employment Relationships: Experimental Evidence on Managerial Control and Performance Pay. 2013. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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