G2TT
来源类型Working Paper
规范类型报告
DOI10.3386/w19649
来源IDWorking Paper 19649
Dishonesty and Selection into Public Service
Rema Hanna; Shing-Yi Wang
发表日期2013-11-14
出版年2013
语种英语
摘要In this paper, we demonstrate that university students who cheat on a simple task in a laboratory setting are more likely to state a preference for entering public service. Importantly, we also show that cheating on this task is predictive of corrupt behavior by real government workers, implying that this measure captures a meaningful propensity towards corruption. Students who demonstrate lower levels of prosocial preferences in the laboratory games are also more likely to prefer to enter the government, while outcomes on explicit, two-player games to measure cheating and attitudinal measures of corruption do not systematically predict job preferences. We find that a screening process that chooses the highest ability applicants would not alter the average propensity for corruption among the applicant pool. Our findings imply that differential selection into government may contribute, in part, to corruption. They also emphasize that screening characteristics other than ability may be useful in reducing corruption, but caution that more explicit measures may offer little predictive power.
主题Public Economics ; Development and Growth ; Development
URLhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w19649
来源智库National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/577323
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Rema Hanna,Shing-Yi Wang. Dishonesty and Selection into Public Service. 2013.
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