| 来源类型 | Working Paper
|
| 规范类型 | 报告
|
| DOI | 10.3386/w19649
|
| 来源ID | Working Paper 19649
|
| Dishonesty and Selection into Public Service |
| Rema Hanna; Shing-Yi Wang
|
| 发表日期 | 2013-11-14
|
| 出版年 | 2013
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | In this paper, we demonstrate that university students who cheat on a simple task in a laboratory setting are more likely to state a preference for entering public service. Importantly, we also show that cheating on this task is predictive of corrupt behavior by real government workers, implying that this measure captures a meaningful propensity towards corruption. Students who demonstrate lower levels of prosocial preferences in the laboratory games are also more likely to prefer to enter the government, while outcomes on explicit, two-player games to measure cheating and attitudinal measures of corruption do not systematically predict job preferences. We find that a screening process that chooses the highest ability applicants would not alter the average propensity for corruption among the applicant pool. Our findings imply that differential selection into government may contribute, in part, to corruption. They also emphasize that screening characteristics other than ability may be useful in reducing corruption, but caution that more explicit measures may offer little predictive power. |
| 主题 | Public Economics
; Development and Growth
; Development
|
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w19649
|
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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| 引用统计 |
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
|
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/577323
|
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Rema Hanna,Shing-Yi Wang. Dishonesty and Selection into Public Service. 2013.
|
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