| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w19669 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 19669 |
| Liquidity and Governance | |
| Kerry Back; Tao Li; Alexander Ljungqvist | |
| 发表日期 | 2013-11-21 |
| 出版年 | 2013 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Is greater trading liquidity good or bad for corporate governance? We address this question both theoretically and empirically. We solve a model consisting of an optimal IPO followed by a dynamic Kyle market in which the large investor's private information concerns her own plans for taking an active role in governance. We show that an increase in the liquidity of the firm's stock increases the likelihood of the large investor 'taking the Wall Street walk.' Thus, higher liquidity is harmful for governance. Empirical tests using three distinct sources of exogenous variation in liquidity confirm the negative relation between liquidity and blockholder activism. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions ; Corporate Finance |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w19669 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/577344 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Kerry Back,Tao Li,Alexander Ljungqvist. Liquidity and Governance. 2013. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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