| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w19672 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 19672 |
| Unemployment Insurance and Disability Insurance in the Great Recession | |
| Andreas I. Mueller; Jesse Rothstein; Till M. von Wachter | |
| 发表日期 | 2013-11-21 |
| 出版年 | 2013 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Disability insurance (DI) applications and awards are countercyclical. One potential explanation is that unemployed individuals who exhaust their Unemployment Insurance (UI) benefits use DI as a form of extended benefits. We exploit the haphazard pattern of UI benefit extensions in the Great Recession to identify the effect of UI exhaustion on DI application, using both aggregate data at the state-month and state-week levels and microdata on unemployed individuals in the Current Population Survey. We find no indication that expiration of UI benefits causes DI applications. Our estimates are sufficiently precise to rule out effects of meaningful magnitude. |
| 主题 | Public Economics ; National Fiscal Issues ; Labor Economics ; Unemployment and Immigration |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w19672 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/577347 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Andreas I. Mueller,Jesse Rothstein,Till M. von Wachter. Unemployment Insurance and Disability Insurance in the Great Recession. 2013. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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