| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w19734 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 19734 |
| Endogenous Property Rights | |
| Daniel Diermeier; Georgy Egorov; Konstantin Sonin | |
| 发表日期 | 2013-12-12 |
| 出版年 | 2013 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | It is often argued that additional checks and balances provide economic agents with better protection from expropriation of their wealth or productive capital. We demonstrate that in a dynamic political economy model this intuition may be flawed. Surprisingly, increasing the number of veto players or the majority requirement for redistribution may reduce property right protection on the equilibrium path. The reason is the existence of two distinct mechanisms of property rights protection. One are formal constraints that allow individuals or groups to block any redistribution which is not in their favor. The other occurs in equilibrium where agents without such powers protect each other from redistribution. Players without formal blocking power anticipate that the expropriation of other similar players will ultimately hurt them and thus combine their influence to prevent redistributions. Yet, such incentives can be undermined by adding formal constraints. The flip-side of this effect is that individual investment efforts might require coordination. The model also predicts that the distribution of wealth in societies with weaker formal institutions (smaller supermajority requirements) among players without veto power will tend to be more homogenous. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Other ; Economic Systems |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w19734 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/577408 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Daniel Diermeier,Georgy Egorov,Konstantin Sonin. Endogenous Property Rights. 2013. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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