| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w19737 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 19737 |
| Private Politics and Public Regulation | |
| Georgy Egorov; Bård Harstad | |
| 发表日期 | 2013-12-12 |
| 出版年 | 2013 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We develop a dynamic game to explore the interaction between regulation and private policies, such as self-regulation by firms and activism. Without a public regulator, the possibility of self-regulation is bad for the firm, but good for activists who are willing to maintain a costly boycott to raise the likelihood of self-regulation. Results are reversed when the regulator is present: the firm then self-regulates to preempt public regulation, while activists start and continue boycotts to raise the likelihood of such regulation. Our analytical results describe when a boycott is likely, and when it may be expected to be short and/or successful. The model generates a rich set of testable comparative statics. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Industrial Organization ; Nonprofits ; Regulatory Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w19737 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/577411 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Georgy Egorov,Bård Harstad. Private Politics and Public Regulation. 2013. |
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