| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w19799 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 19799 |
| Governing Misvalued Firms | |
| Dalida Kadyrzhanova; Matthew Rhodes-Kropf | |
| 发表日期 | 2014-01-16 |
| 出版年 | 2014 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Equity overvaluation is thought to create the potential for managerial misbehavior, while monitoring and corporate governance curb misbehavior. We combine these two insights from the literatures on misvaluation and governance to ask 'when does governance matter?' Examining firms with standard long-run measures of corporate governance as they are shocked by plausible misvaluation, we provide consistent evidence that firm performance is impacted by governance when firms become overvalued - overvaluation causes weaker performance in poorly governed firms. Our findings imply that firm oversight is important during market booms, just when stock prices suggest all is well. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Corporate Finance |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w19799 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/577473 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Dalida Kadyrzhanova,Matthew Rhodes-Kropf. Governing Misvalued Firms. 2014. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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