| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w19825 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 19825 |
| Incentives, Selection and Productivity in Labor Markets: Evidence from Rural Malawi | |
| Raymond P. Guiteras; B. Kelsey Jack | |
| 发表日期 | 2014-01-16 |
| 出版年 | 2014 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | An observed positive relationship between compensation and productivity cannot distinguish between two channels: (1) an incentive effect and (2) worker selection. We use a simplified Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism, which provides random variation in piece rates conditional on revealed reservation rates, to separately identify the two channels in the context of casual labor markets in rural Malawi. A higher piece rate increases output in our setting, but does not attract more productive workers. Among men, the average worker recruited at higher piece rates is actually less productive. Local labor market imperfections appear to undermine the worker sorting observed in well-functioning labor markets. |
| 主题 | Econometrics ; Experimental Design ; Labor Economics ; Labor Supply and Demand ; Labor Compensation ; Development and Growth ; Development |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w19825 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/577498 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Raymond P. Guiteras,B. Kelsey Jack. Incentives, Selection and Productivity in Labor Markets: Evidence from Rural Malawi. 2014. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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