| 来源类型 | Working Paper
|
| 规范类型 | 报告
|
| DOI | 10.3386/w19863
|
| 来源ID | Working Paper 19863
|
| Loose Knots: Strong versus Weak Commitments to Save for Education in Uganda |
| Dean Karlan; Leigh L. Linden
|
| 发表日期 | 2014-01-30
|
| 出版年 | 2014
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | Commitment devices offer an opportunity to restrict future choices. However, strict commitments may deter participation. Using a school-based commitment savings program for children to save for educational expenses in Uganda, we compare an account fully-committed to school expenses to an account with a weaker commitment (funds withdrawn in cash, rather than a voucher). Children save more in the weaker commitment treatment arm, and when combined with parental outreach, spend more on educational supplies and score 0.11 standard deviations higher on math and language test scores. We find no effect from the fully-committed account, and no effect for either account on attendance, enrollment, or non-cognitive skills. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics
; Households and Firms
; Behavioral Economics
; Health, Education, and Welfare
; Education
; Development and Growth
; Development
|
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w19863
|
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
|
| 引用统计 |
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
|
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/577537
|
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Dean Karlan,Leigh L. Linden. Loose Knots: Strong versus Weak Commitments to Save for Education in Uganda. 2014.
|
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