| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w19875 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 19875 |
| Testing for Information Asymmetries in Real Estate Markets | |
| Pablo Kurlat; Johannes Stroebel | |
| 发表日期 | 2014-01-30 |
| 出版年 | 2014 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study equilibrium outcomes in markets with asymmetric information about asset values among both buyers and sellers. In residential real estate markets hard-to-observe neighborhood characteristics are a key source of information heterogeneity: sellers are usually better informed about neighborhood values than buyers, but there are some sellers and some buyers that are better informed than their peers. We propose a new theoretical framework for analyzing such markets with many heterogeneous assets and differentially informed agents. Consistent with the predictions from this framework, we find that changes in the seller composition towards (i) more informed sellers and (ii) sellers with a larger supply elasticity predict subsequent house-price declines and demographic changes in that neighborhood. This effect is larger for houses whose value depends more on neighborhood characteristics, and smaller for houses bought by more informed buyers. Our findings suggest that home owners have superior information about important neighborhood characteristics, and exploit this information to time local market movements. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; General Equilibrium ; Economics of Information ; Financial Economics ; Financial Markets ; Regional and Urban Economics ; Real Estate |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w19875 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/577548 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Pablo Kurlat,Johannes Stroebel. Testing for Information Asymmetries in Real Estate Markets. 2014. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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