| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w19879 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 19879 |
| Risk Aversion and the Desirability of Attenuated Legal Change | |
| Steven Shavell | |
| 发表日期 | 2014-02-06 |
| 出版年 | 2014 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This article develops two points. First, insurance against the risk of legal change is largely unavailable, primarily because of the correlated nature of the losses that legal change generates. Second, given the absence of insurance against legal change, it is generally desirable for legal change to be attenuated. Specifically, in a model of uncertainty about two different types of legal change--in regulatory standards, and in payments for harm caused--it is demonstrated that the optimal new regulatory standard is less than the conventionally efficient standard, and that the optimal new payment for harm is less than the harm. |
| 主题 | Public Economics ; Other ; Law and Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w19879 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/577553 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Steven Shavell. Risk Aversion and the Desirability of Attenuated Legal Change. 2014. |
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