| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w19946 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 19946 |
| Maturity Rationing and Collective Short-Termism | |
| Konstantin Milbradt; Martin Oehmke | |
| 发表日期 | 2014-02-27 |
| 出版年 | 2014 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Financing terms and investment decisions are jointly determined. This interdependence links firms' asset and liability sides and can lead to short-termism in investment. In our model, financing frictions increase with the investment horizon, such that financing for long-term projects is relatively expensive and potentially rationed. In response, firms whose first-best investment opportunities are long-term may change their investments towards second-best projects of shorter maturities. This worsens financing terms for firms with shorter maturity projects, inducing them to change their investments as well. In equilibrium, investment is inefficiently short-term. Equilibrium asset-side adjustments by firms can amplify shocks and, while privately optimal, can be socially undesirable. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Portfolio Selection and Asset Pricing ; Corporate Finance |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w19946 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/577617 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Konstantin Milbradt,Martin Oehmke. Maturity Rationing and Collective Short-Termism. 2014. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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