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来源类型Working Paper
规范类型报告
DOI10.3386/w19953
来源IDWorking Paper 19953
Opting Out of Good Governance
C. Fritz Foley; Paul Goldsmith-Pinkham; Jonathan Greenstein; Eric Zwick
发表日期2014-03-06
出版年2014
语种英语
摘要Cross-listing on a U.S. exchange does not bond foreign firms to follow the corporate governance rules of that exchange. Hand-collected data show that 80% of cross-listed firms opt out of at least one exchange governance rule, instead committing to observe the rules of their home country. Relative to firms that comply, firms that opt out have weaker governance practices in that they have a smaller share of independent directors. The decision to opt out reflects the relative costs and benefits of doing so. Cross-listed firms opt out more when coming from countries with weak corporate governance rules, but if firms based in such countries are growing and have a need for external finance, they are more likely to comply. Finally, opting out affects the value of cash holdings. For cross-listed firms based in countries with weak governance rules, a dollar of cash held inside the firm is worth $1.52 if the firm fully complies with U.S. exchange rules but just $0.32 if it is non-compliant.
主题International Economics ; International Factor Mobility ; Financial Economics ; Corporate Finance ; Other ; Law and Economics
URLhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w19953
来源智库National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/577627
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
C. Fritz Foley,Paul Goldsmith-Pinkham,Jonathan Greenstein,et al. Opting Out of Good Governance. 2014.
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