| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w19953 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 19953 |
| Opting Out of Good Governance | |
| C. Fritz Foley; Paul Goldsmith-Pinkham; Jonathan Greenstein; Eric Zwick | |
| 发表日期 | 2014-03-06 |
| 出版年 | 2014 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Cross-listing on a U.S. exchange does not bond foreign firms to follow the corporate governance rules of that exchange. Hand-collected data show that 80% of cross-listed firms opt out of at least one exchange governance rule, instead committing to observe the rules of their home country. Relative to firms that comply, firms that opt out have weaker governance practices in that they have a smaller share of independent directors. The decision to opt out reflects the relative costs and benefits of doing so. Cross-listed firms opt out more when coming from countries with weak corporate governance rules, but if firms based in such countries are growing and have a need for external finance, they are more likely to comply. Finally, opting out affects the value of cash holdings. For cross-listed firms based in countries with weak governance rules, a dollar of cash held inside the firm is worth $1.52 if the firm fully complies with U.S. exchange rules but just $0.32 if it is non-compliant. |
| 主题 | International Economics ; International Factor Mobility ; Financial Economics ; Corporate Finance ; Other ; Law and Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w19953 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/577627 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | C. Fritz Foley,Paul Goldsmith-Pinkham,Jonathan Greenstein,et al. Opting Out of Good Governance. 2014. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
