全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Why Do Banks Practice Regulatory Arbitrage? Evidence from Usage of Trust Preferred Securities

G2TT

来源类型	Working Paper
规范类型	报告
DOI	10.3386/w19984
来源ID	Working Paper 19984
	Why Do Banks Practice Regulatory Arbitrage? Evidence from Usage of Trust Preferred Securities
	Nicole Boyson; Rüdiger Fahlenbrach; René M. Stulz
发表日期	2014-03-20
出版年	2014
语种	英语
摘要	We propose a theory of regulatory arbitrage by banks and test it using trust preferred securities (TPS) issuance. From 1996 to 2007, U.S. banks in the aggregate increased their regulatory capital through issuance of TPS while their net issuance of common stock was negative due to repurchases. We assume that, in the absence of capital requirements, a bank has an optimal capital structure that depends on its business model. Capital requirements can impose constraints on bank decisions. If a bank's optimal capital structure also meets regulatory capital requirements with a sufficient buffer, the bank is unconstrained by these requirements. We expect that unconstrained banks will not issue TPS, that constrained banks will issue TPS and engage in other forms of regulatory arbitrage, and that banks with TPS will be riskier than other banks with the same amount of regulatory capital, and therefore, more adversely affected by the credit crisis. Our empirical evidence supports these predictions.
主题	Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions
URL	https://www.nber.org/papers/w19984
来源智库	National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/577658
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Nicole Boyson,Rüdiger Fahlenbrach,René M. Stulz. Why Do Banks Practice Regulatory Arbitrage? Evidence from Usage of Trust Preferred Securities. 2014.