| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w19988 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 19988 |
| Optimal Employment Contracts with Hidden Search | |
| Rasmus Lentz | |
| 发表日期 | 2014-03-20 |
| 出版年 | 2014 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In this paper I explore optimal employment contract design in a random search framework, where workers search on and off the job for employment opportunities similar to that of Lentz (2010) and Bagger and Lentz (2013). The worker determines the frequency by which employment opportunities arrive through a costly choice of search intensity, which is unobserved by the firm and cannot be directly contracted upon. Firms differ in productivity by which they employ workers. Firms compete over workers in terms of utility promises in a fashion otherwise similar to that of Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002). As in Burdett and Coles (2003) and Burdett and Coles (2010), optimal tenure conditional contracts are shown to be back loaded to discourage the worker from generating outside competitive pressure. The analysis establishes existence, uniqueness and provides characterization of the core mechanism. The paper applies the framework to the analysis of firm provided general human capital training. It is shown that more productive firms provide more training and pay higher wages. |
| 主题 | Macroeconomics ; Consumption and Investment ; Labor Economics ; Labor Supply and Demand ; Labor Compensation ; Labor Market Structures ; Unemployment and Immigration |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w19988 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/577662 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Rasmus Lentz. Optimal Employment Contracts with Hidden Search. 2014. |
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